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The debate about reforming the international financial architecture began in the mid 1990s in 
the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis in 1994. However, it was really the East Asian crisis of 1997-
98 that breathed life into the debate and helped to shape it. The debate has subsequently centered on 
trying to prevent crises happening and on dealing with them effectively and efficiently when they do. 
In addressing these central issues it has ranged over many topics, including domestic financial reform, 
debt and crisis management, exchange rate policy, and the role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
Viewed from a political economy perspective it was always unlikely that the debate would 
lead to fundamental reform of the world's monetary system. After all, the global economy was 
performing quite well in the second half of the 1990s according to most conventional indicators, so 
what was the justification for reform? Contagion turned out to be much more of a regional than a 
global phenomenon. And, in any case, there has not been a clear consensus around how the 
underlying financing and adjustment mechanisms that define the international monetary system 
should be changed. Of course, things have happened and changes have been made but it is difficult to 
describe these as altering the international financial architecture. They have tended to be relatively 
modest. 
At the same time while, as expected, reform at the global level has been slow and piecemeal 
and is likely to remain so, there may be more potential for reform at the regional level. Amongst 
Asian economies, the crisis of 1997-98 imposed severe economic costs, and, in some cases, social and 
political costs as well. The strength and sustainability of the recovery from crisis still remains in some 
doubt, such that the motivation for reform may not have been entirely lost (Park, 2001b). There may 
consequently be a better chance for reforming the Asian financial architecture. But what form would 
this take? 
This Essay examines key aspects of a new Asian financial architecture. It describes and 
evaluates progress, identifies the remaining issues that have to be resolved, and addresses the 
prospects for future reform. In particular, it asks the following questions. First, to what extent have the 




financial and corporate systems been strengthened adequately? Second, what are the lessons for 
exchange rate policy in the region? Did the fixation with pegged exchange rates help to cause the 
crisis, and is the appropriate implication that Asian economies should opt either for firm fixity in the 
form of a common regional currency or for flexible exchange rates? Third, in providing short term 
liquidity in the midst of a crisis is there a role for regional arrangements? If so, could this lead to the 
establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and what would be the division of labor between it 
and the IMF? 
In what follows we attempt to work through each of these questions. To anticipate a little, our 
broad conclusion is that there is significantly more scope for a new Asian financial architecture than 
for a new international financial architecture. Indeed, there are signs of evolution in this direction. 
However there are also potential pitfalls that need to be avoided. Appropriately designed and 
implemented, a new Asian financial architecture does not threaten multilateral reform but may 
support and protect the world's financial system. 
 
2.   The Debate About a New Financial Architecture 
2.1  Reforming the International Financial Architecture  
According to some observers the debate about a “new international financial architecture” 
was launched at the Halifax G7 summit in 1995 and, to all extents and purposes, concluded at the 
Cologne summit in 1999 (Kenen, 2001). Like many initially appealing and catchy phrases, the 
“international financial architecture” has at best been only vaguely defined with different 
contributors to the debate laying the emphasis in different places. But, broadly speaking, the topics 
covered have included the provision of economic and financial information, domestic financial 
supervision and regulation, liability management, crisis lending and management and reform of the 
international financial institutions, particularly the IMF (Table 1). The background to the debate 
was set by the Mexican peso crisis in 1994. This had demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, 
that international capital was now highly mobile and that capital volatility - both sudden inflows 
and sudden outflows of capital - could cause severe economic problems. Before the architecture 




discussing ways of dealing with capital volatility and the potential need for larger amounts of 
emergency lending. However, the architecture debate was taken a stage further by the East Asian 
crisis in 1997.  
Why had neither the Mexican crisis nor the Asian crisis been widely anticipated? What 
had caused the crises? And had they been well handled? It was in the context of these questions 
that attention began to focus on the availability of adequate information. Perhaps, for example, 
prediction had been poor because the extent of forward commitments in foreign exchange markets 
had sometimes not been appreciated, making the adequacy of international reserves rather less than 
appeared, or because fiscal deficits had been inappropriately measured. Moreover, while 
commentators differed over the degree to which the crises were caused by illiquidity as opposed to 
deficient fundamentals, and indeed over what constituted “fundamentals”, few demurred from the 
view that weak domestic financial systems had something to do with it. In its most extreme form, 
inadequate risk analysis was presented as a dimension of “crony capitalism”. On this basis, reform 
of domestic financial systems was presented as a key step in strengthening the international 
financial system. The architecture debate also reinforced what appeared to have been overlooked 
principles about liquidity mismatches and foreign exchange risk. The dangers of borrowing short 
and lending long, as well as those of carrying unhedged foreign currency liabilities and the 
vulnerability that results, again featured prominently. 
Even with improved information and superior risk analysis and liability management the 
architecture debate acknowledged that not all crises would be avoided. Another crucial element 
therefore related to the handling of crises once they occurred and the roles of private capital 
markets and international financial institutions. What could be done to “bail in” private creditors 
and to avoid a rush for the exits? Should bond contracts be redesigned to include collective action 
clauses? Should the IMF endorse standstills on external debt repayments? Or should the IMF 
become a more fully-fledged international lender of last resort (see Jeanne and Wyplosz, 2000 and 
Willett, 2001b and references cited therein) Should it, furthermore, modify its conditionality? 





2.2  Progress To Date; Unfinished Business 
But what was the debate ever likely to achieve, and, if it has now been concluded, what 
has it achieved? History suggests that discrete and fundamental reform of the international 
financial system is an unlikely event. It occurred in 1944 at Bretton Woods but the circumstances 
were rather special. More arguably, it occurred in 1973 with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system but, in this case, the reform was less the outcome of a “debate” about the design of the 
system and more a matter of expediency; pegging exchange rates had not worked and this left little 
alternative to flexible rates. The Committee of Twenty (C-20) did indeed “debate” the design of 
the international financial system in the early 1970s, but this achieved relatively little of 
significance. The international financial architecture debate of the 1990s shares much more with 
the C-20 episode than it does with the Bretton Woods one; its achievements have been modest, and 
are likely to remain so. 
For fundamental reform to occur a number of criteria need to be met. There has to be wide 
agreement that existing arrangements are not working satisfactorily and this agreement needs to 
include those countries that wield the greatest power in decision-making. Moreover, there has to be 
similar consensus on the nature of needed reform. In the latter part of the 1990s, economic 
performance in many of the world’s largest and most influential economies was relatively strong 
when judged in terms of economic growth, unemployment and inflation (although Japan was a 
notable exception). Moreover, in terms of the US dollar, the Japanese Yen and the euro, there is 
little to challenge the superiority of flexible exchange rates. There was the possibility in the mid-
1990s that further financial crises could plunge the world into recession but this threat did not 
materialize. Although crises continued to occur in East Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina, 
these tended to be regional affairs from which the US and Europe remained relatively insulated. 
There is, in any case, a Catch 22 in the link between economic crises and reform. Without a crisis 
why is reform needed? In the midst of a crisis there is insufficient time to pursue fundamental 
reform; “band aid” reform is therefore much more likely. Assuming the crisis passes, it again 
becomes more difficult to justify fundamental reform; after all the band-aid appeared to have done 




In large measure this is what has happened in the aftermath of the financial crises in 
Mexico and East Asia. International liquidity was injected in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. The 
world avoided large-scale contagion. The crises passed and the momentum for reform - as much as 
it existed - was lost. What has emerged is much more an attempt to formalize ad hoccery. 
Having discovered that, after the event, information was inadequate, the IMF has sought to 
enhance transparency by collecting and disseminating more information via its General and 
Special Data Dissemination Standards and its Policy Framework Papers. The Basel Committee has 
continued to fine tune its guidelines for capital adequacy and prudential supervision and regulation 
and the IMF has introduced Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) to provide precautionary resources in 
the event of contagion from a crisis. But while the logic behind these reforms may be sound, they 
hardly constitute a new international financial architecture. There can be little guarantee that all 
relevant information is now being collected and even less that it will always be accurately 
interpreted. Guidelines on good practice in terms of domestic financial supervision are only helpful 
if implemented, but there are few structured incentives to implement them. For its part, the CCL 
has been heavily criticized and remains unused. 
The IMF has undertaken a number of internal reviews covering the range of its lending 
facilities, conditionality and quotas, but at present it is difficult to pick out any changes that are 
much more than cosmetic. For example, abandonment of the Buffer Stock Financing Facility 
which had not been used for fifteen years, or the contingency component of the Compensatory and 
Contingency Financing Facility that had not be used for eight years, represents house-cleaning 
rather than a new architecture. Add to this little progress on the redesign of bond contracts and on 
debt standstills, and it remains hard to be up-beat about the achievements of the architecture 
debate. Issues have been aired and modest and piecemeal modifications have been made; but a 
new architecture, hardly! 
Is this situation likely to change? Perhaps it is over-ambitious to expect rapid reform. 
Clearly a global depression of 1930s proportions could in part recreate the circumstances that 




wrong and what needs to be done might not be so easily replicated
1. In reality, the continuing 
pivotal role of the US dollar along with the often apparently inexhaustible supply of liquidity with 
which the US may finance its current account balance of payments deficit rules the US out as a 
major advocate of fundamental reform. Similarly, the probability must be close to zero that any 
current member of the Euro zone or the European Union (EU) for that matter will need to turn to 
the IMF for financial assistance. For the Europeans, reform at the regional level has largely 
replaced their direct interest in global financial reform, unless contagion from a crisis elsewhere, as 
for example in Russia, becomes/threatens to become a problem. The increasing indifference shown 
by the major economic powers to economic crises elsewhere in the world has been exemplified by 
the benign neglect shown by the US for the crisis in Argentina in 2001/2. This situation seems 
unlikely to change in the near future. 
The conclusion would therefore seem to be that while there may be scope for modest 
financial reform or redesign at the global level - the importance of which should probably not be 
understated - the scope for establishing anything approaching a new international financial 
architecture is strictly limited. However, the reasons that make a new architecture unlikely at the 
global level may simultaneously make it much more likely at a regional level. 
 
2.3   The Asian Financial Architecture 
Looking at the issues that have gone to make up the architecture debate, and taking an 
Asian perspective rather than a global one, there is more reason to believe that there is both more 
scope for reform and more motivation to pursue it. In the main it was the Asian economies that 
suffered the costs of the 1997-98 crisis. These costs were substantial, representing shortfalls in 
output of up to 40 per cent. Significant declines in living standards were involved. Moreover, with 
recessions of this size, even renewed economic growth takes some time to bring an economy back 
to where it was before. The costs therefore linger on. While contagion at the global level was 
muted, this was not the case amongst Asian economies where, having been triggered by events in 
                                                           
1 According to Eichengreen and James (2001), one reason why international financial reforms are not occurring at 




Thailand, the crisis spread to Korea, Indonesia and other regional economies. Even those that 
escaped the worst excesses of contagion were still adversely affected via trade effects, interest rate 
effects and exchange rate effects, let alone the effects of a pessimistic psychological band wagon 
(Rajan, 2002a). Life became more difficult for all economies in the region. Subsequent research 
has confirmed the regional nature of contagion. Against this background, there may be relatively 
strong support within the region for reform which minimizes its vulnerability to future crises and 
contagion. Even those countries that managed to circumvent the 1997-98 crisis reasonably 
unscathed may believe that they might not be so fortunate on a subsequent occasion and could 
therefore have a vested interest in reform. 
What about the regional hegemonic power? Unlike the US, for whom the 1990s were a 
decade of economic success, Japan has been apparently trapped in a low level equilibrium. Indeed, 
the Japanese recovery that flickered in 1996 was hardly helped by the Asian crisis in the following 
two years. While the US may appear to have been largely unconcerned by the crisis in Brazil in 
1999 or the one in Argentina in 2001, it is reasonable to presume that Japan would be much more 
concerned about further economic crises in Asia and has a direct interest in seeking to avoid them 
(Chang and Rajan, 1999). While there is always the possibility that inertia will set in as the 1997-
98 crisis becomes a more distant memory, this is less likely at the regional level where the full 
force of the crisis was experienced than at the global level, where many influential economies 
managed to effectively bypass the crisis. 
So for the Asian economies there is a much clearer picture that something was wrong with 
the situation that existed in 1997-98, and, given the analysis above, the presumption that reforms at 
the global level are unlikely to provide adequate mechanisms for dealing with future crises may 
create a momentum for regional reform. There is also a broadly shared diagnosis among Asian 
economies of what went wrong and therefore what needs to be put right. 
This diagnosis comprises a number of elements. First, weak domestic financial systems 
make economies vulnerable to crises. Weakness can result from inadequate risk analysis, maturity 
mismatches and an inappropriate exchange rate denomination of assets and liabilities. Second, 




problems, irrespective of what genus of currency crisis model is adopted. Where devaluation 
eventually occurs its “balance sheets” effects can rapidly transform a currency crisis into a 
domestic financial crisis, such that the devaluation itself has short-run recessionary effects. Third, 
once international reserves have been depleted to some threshold level, and in the absence of 
sufficient private capital inflows, there will be little option other than to turn to the IMF; unless 
measures to block capital outflows are envisaged. International reserves that are deemed adequate 
before a crisis, or even more than adequate, can rapidly disappear such that reserve depletion offers 
little other than a very short-term response. On top of this, reserve depletion which is unsterilized 
will have significant recessionary domestic monetary effects. Sterilization will however offset 
improvements in the current account of the balance of payments. Although economic fundamentals 
may not have been entirely sound, problems of illiquidity certainly contributed significantly to the 
dimensions of the 1997-98 crises. 
This analysis implies that to minimize the risks of future crises and to mitigate the effects 
of crises, reform needs to address these issues; issues that have largely constituted the agenda of 
the architecture debate. What follows on from this is, in many ways, rather unsurprising. The 
debate about a new international financial architecture was very much stimulated by the East Asian 
crisis. As the debate took shape it therefore focused on the issues that had been particularly 
apposite in the case of that crisis. And yet, the nature and the very title of the debate suggested that 
the resolution of the problems associated with the East Asian crisis required action at the 
international level. The argument in this Essay is that significant reform at the global level is 
unlikely; something that events seem to be confirming. Reform at the regional level has a higher 
chance of success. This reform should cover domestic financial systems, exchange rate regimes 
and regional liquidity arrangements. The remainder of this Essay fleshes out some of these issues 





3.  Financial Containment and Restructuring in Asia: 
3.1  What has Been Done  
Financial sector restructuring has been presented as an essential element in structural 
adjustment programs in the East Asian economies (Lane and Associates, 1999). There are broadly two 
phases in resolving financial system distress; “containment” and “restructuring”.  
The containment or "distress resolution" phase occurs during the onset of a financial crisis 
when there has been a loss of confidence in the financial system. The primary strategic consideration 
here is to stabilize the financial system and to prevent a credit crunch and an economic slowdown, 
which then exacerbates financial difficulties. This usually involves providing large-scale liquidity 
support to financial institutions. The secondary aim is to limit losses. This may involve closing 
unviable banks, mergers or even nationalization. In order to prevent bank panics, government 
guarantees on liabilities of existing banks may also be issued
2. As the Indonesian experience 
illustrates, a failure to “contain” may exacerbate financial turbulence with potentially severe 
sociopolitical repercussions
3. Empirical analysis by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) reveals that 
unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support and repeated recapitalizations are among 
the factors that can significantly add to the fiscal costs of banking crisis and restructuring
4.  
Having been through the containment stage, the five East Asian economies worst impacted by 
the 1997-98 crisis, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines (henceforth 
referred to as the Asia-5 economies), are now embarked on a process of rehabilitation and 
                                                           
2 There is an important practical issue of being able to decide between illiquid but solvent versus insolvent financial 
institutions. As noted by Lindgren et al. (1999) of the Thai debacle 
The selection of nonviable institutions to be closed relied largely on liquidity indicators, such as 
borrowing from the central banks…The liquidity triggers typically included the size of central bank credit 
as a multiple of bank capital. Only later, as more information became available either through special 
audits or the supervisory process, could solvency indicators be used as criteria for choosing nonviable 
institutions (p.34).  
 
3 Two problems faced by Indonesia in particular but also the other crisis-hit economies during the phase were (a) 
acute loss of macroeconomic confidence following excessive monetary creation to provide liquidity to the 
distressed financial system, and (b) the sudden (and non-transparent) closure of insolvent financial institutions.  
 






5. At the risk of generalizing, governments in the Asia-5 economies have attempted to 
restructure their financial systems by: 
-  closing down commercial banks and finance companies; 
-  merging some existing institutions and nationalizing others; 
-  permitting foreign investment into the financial sector; 
-  injecting public funds to recapitalized viable banks; 
-  putting in place systematic asset resolution strategies. 
Table 2 provides some information on the measures taken by the regional economies to restructure 
financial systems.  
  With regard to asset resolution, all the regional economies except Thailand have transferred 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) from banks to centralized Asset Management Companies (AMCs)
6. In 
Thailand, banks were initially left individually responsible for establishing their own AMCs. The Thai 
government did establish the Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA) in October 1997 to review 
rehabilitation plans of the 58 suspended finance companies and to oversee their liquidation (all but 
two were shut down). An asset management company was also set up centrally but only as a buyer or 
bidder of last resort for the lowest quality assets in order to prevent a fire sale of assets of the 56 
closed finance companies (Rajan, 2001).  
  Referring to Table 3, all the economies had, by 1999, made some headway in reducing 
nonperforming loans (NPLs). NPL ratios for commercial banks in Korea and Malaysia fell to less 
than 10 percent, due in part to rapid economic recovery (i.e. banks have to some extent grown out of 
their problems). In contrast, NPLs remained high in Thailand (about 30 percent), perhaps reflecting 
the Thai government's preference for a more market-oriented approach to financial restructuring. 
However, according to some estimates, between one fifth and a third of the NPLs in Thailand are 
“strategic” in the sense that borrowers, while able to repay, have been unwilling to do so since legal 
                                                           
5 Only an overview is provided here. For detailed discussions of financial restructuring in the Asia-5 economies, 
see ADB (2000), ARIC (2000, 2001a), Claessens et al. (2000), Kawaii (2001), Lindgren et al. (1999) and World 
Bank (2000a,b). Park (2001b) provides an overall assessment of the financial and corporate restructuring in the 
East Asian economies.   
 




recourse by creditors tends to be rather ineffective (discussed below). Interestingly, Thailand has 
announced that a centralized AMC is to be established to carve out NPLs of the state and private 
banks, which, as noted, remain stubbornly high (ARIC, 2001a,b and Park, 2001b). 
 
3.2  What Still Needs to be Done?  
A report on the Asia-5 economies describes the state of events relating to the cleaning up of 
the banks' balance sheets by the AMCs in the following way (ARIC, 2000).  
During 2000, debt restructuring through…(AMCs) has made further progress in 
Korea and Malaysia, as well as Indonesia…The Korea Asset Management 
Corporation (KAMCO) purchased more than 50 percent of the banking system's 
NPLs by July 2000 and had disposed of the 40 percent of those it had acquired. 
Danaharta had acquired a little more than 40 percent of NPLs in the Malaysian 
banking system by August 2000, amounting to about 15 percent of the country's 
GDP. It is estimated that, as of June 2000, Danaharta had disposed of 61 percent of 
the NPLs under its jurisdiction. In Indonesia, it is estimated that more than 75 percent 
of the total NPLs in the banking system, amounting to 60 percent of GDP, are now 
under IBRA's control. However, uncooperative and politically powerful debtors, and 
an inadequate legislative and regulatory environment have hampered the recovery of 
asset values in the country. As of June 2000, only 0.35 percent, representing 
corporate loans, of acquired NPLs has been disposed of by IBRA…In Thailand, it 
was reported that almost all the loans of closed financial institutions acquired by the 
Financial Sector Restructuring Agency (FRA) had been disposed of by December 
1999. No data on debt restructuring by commercial banks are available, but some 
banks are reportedly back to profitability (pp. 12-3). 
 
Thus, while these transfers have helped to recapitalize banks and reduce NPLs, the disposal of 
assets by the AMCs has been rather slow. This has been due, at least partly, to the fact that the assets 
transferred to the AMCs are corporate and not real estate which are easier to restructure. Additional 
factors such as political influence and uncertainties, powerful debtors and lack of interested buyers, 
inadequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws and opaqueness in operations and processes, are cited as 
reasons for the slow asset disposal in the regional economies (ARIC, 2000, 2001a,b).  
Failure to adequately address banking sector problems can be a severe impediment to 
corporate debt resolution and restructuring. Indirect evidence of market concerns regarding lack of 
progress in financial restructuring in the Asia-5 economies is captured by trends in the ratio of the 
financial stock index to the overall (general) stock index (ARIC, 2000). This ratio recovered to its pre-
crisis level only in Malaysia. At the other extreme, the ratio is only about one quarter of its pre-crisis 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




level in Indonesia and it has deteriorated rapidly recently in the case of the Philippines. The indices in 
Korea and Thailand are stuck at about half their pre-crisis values. All of this appears to suggest that 
there is continuing concern about the health of the financial systems in the Asia-5 economies, with the 
possible exception of Malaysia. 
Slow progress towards corporate debt restructuring is the single biggest obstacle towards 
improving banks' balance sheets and, consequently, domestic credit availability, particularly to small 
and medium-sized enterprises
7. Table 4 summarizes progress with corporate restructuring in four of 
the five crisis-hit economies. By and large, corporate restructuring has lagged behind financial sector 
restructuring. Korea has been the front-runner, having introduced measures to strengthen corporate 
governance, with Indonesia making the least progress. However, even in Korea, while there have been 
some reductions in the debt-equity ratios of the largest chaebols, corporate restructuring remains a 
daunting task. Operational restructuring of ailing corporates has not kept pace with restructuring of 
their financial obligations in terms of reducing debt-equity ratios (through rescheduling debt and 
lengthening the maturity of corporate debt). The ARIC (2001b) has made the following observation  
Ultimately, an improvement in debt servicing capacity requires a return to operational 
profitability. Progress in operational restructuring of the corporate sector has 
generally been patchy in all five crisis countries. There are several constraints on 
operational restructuring of the corporate sectors, including excessive concentration 
of ownership of businesses, political interference, worker resistance, inadequate 
insolvency and bankruptcy laws, and ineffective judiciary (p.13). 
 
Notwithstanding efforts to introduce or make more effective bankruptcy laws in all the 
countries, the judicial systems in a number of them remain rather weak. The ARIC (2000) summarizes 
the situation as follows 
Bankruptcy courts, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand, may have difficulty coping 
with the backlog of cases that is likely to build up. If institutions prove to be 
ineffective in resolving the debt overhang, this will bode badly for international 
investment and could again threaten bank capital…Following restructuring, some 
debtors have run into difficulties anew. It would seem that the needed operational 
reforms do not always accompany balance sheet restructuring. Capacity utilization 
rates are, in general, on the rise, but substantial excess capacity remains in some 
sectors. Resistance to the painful changes that are required will ultimately have an 
adverse effect on competitiveness and foreign investor sentiment (p. 22). 
 
                                                           
7 SMEs have been especially hard hit by the credit crunch, particularly since many are in the nontradable sector. In 




While crisis countries have made some important strides with regard to bank recapitalization 
and rehabilitation, concerns exist about the future path of policy reforms. There are signs of waning 
reform commitments following the global economic slowdown and domestic political concerns, 
especially so in the case of Indonesia.  
There can be little room for complacency, particularly since some of the long-term reforms to 
enhance the overall efficiency and robustness of the domestic financial system as well as operational 
corporate restructuring remain to be tackled. A partial list of such measures might include limiting 
government guarantees and, where these are deemed necessary, ensuring that they are explicit and 
appropriately priced; diversifying financial systems to reduce dependence on bank intermediation 
through the development of equity, insurance and bond markets
8; enhancing the transparency in the 
financial system and improving ex ante incentives, developing an efficient bankruptcy regime, as well 
as strengthening corporate and financial governance structures (such and protecting the rights of 
minority shareholders).  
  While all these measures are critical, a key difference between the crisis-hit economies 
(Thailand in particular) and the less affected ones, was the lax prudential regulations (either de facto 
or de jure) of the private sector in the former. At least part of this was due to the misunderstanding of 
the concepts of liberalization versus reform. In the haste to liberalize their economies (the financial 
sector in particular), so as to integrate with the global economy in a market-consistent manner, some 
of the East Asian economies essentially “threw caution to the wind”. A well-functioning market 
economy does not mean no government intervention per se; financial globalization requires the role of 
government to be shifted from being an active participant (through, for instance, state ownership of 
banks and other monopolies) to one that focuses on acting as an independent, objective “mediator”, 
“rule-maker” and “enforcer”. To this end, a strong and independent bank supervisory function free 
                                                           
8 The need to develop domestic and regional bond markets has been belatedly recognized by the regional 
economies. The Bank of Thailand’s former governor, Chatu Mongol Sonakul, recently noted 
(T)he biggest challenge to us all must be how the crisis could have been avoided in the first 
place. If can turn back the clock and have a wish, my list may be long. But high in its ranking 
would be a well functioning Thai baht bond market…a bond market provides a basic 
infrastructure for the development of the financial system and the overall economy. The bond 
market is an important alternative to bank lending (comments presented at the ADB Conference 
on Government Bond Market and Financial Sector Development in Developing Asian 




from political interference is essential, as is establishing a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory 
framework. Measures here include limiting bank exposures to the property sector, strengthening 
lending guidelines, and ensuring that international banking and accounting standards are met
9.  
Internationalizing the financial system (i.e. eliminating of discrimination between foreign and 
domestic financial services providers) to raise its efficiency may also be an important medium and 
longer-term policy measure to enhance the overall efficiency of the banking system. While the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) recognizes the right of countries to maintain 
sovereignty over prudential and related regulations of all financial firms resident in the country 
(Mattoo, 2000), studies suggest that the introduction of foreign banks into developing countries will 
create domestic pressure for local banking authorities in the host countries to enhance and eventually 
harmonize regulatory and supervisory procedures and standards to international levels, particularly 
with regard to risk management practices (Levine, 1996 and Claessens and Glaessner, 1998). 
Moreover, if the banking system has a more internationally diversified asset base, it could be less 
prone to instability and financial crises
10. There are yet other potential advantages of allowing foreign 
bank entry per se - such as lowering overall financial cost structures - which may make it a desirable 
policy in and of itself. Steps have already been taken in the direction of internationalization of the 
financial system by some of the regional economies
11. Care must be taken however to ensure that 
foreign competition is introduced gradually in order to avoid disrupting the domestic financial system 
by enticing domestic banks to opt for increasingly risky investments (i.e. “gambling for redemption”). 
Without this, an increase in bad loans due to risky investments could offset the efficiency gains 
associated with greater international competition (Bird and Rajan, 2001c and Claessens et al. , 1999). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
9 See Mishkin (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of prudential supervision of financial institutions in emerging 
economies with particular reference to crisis prevention. 
 
10 See IMF (2000, chapter 6) for a balanced and up-to-date discussion of the role of foreign banks in emerging 
economies. Rajan (2002a) cautions that foreign bank entry (or privately contracted contingent credit lines) could 
also be a source of financial contagion (also see Section 5.3).  
 





4.  Exchange Rate Policies in Asian Economies 
  An important component of the Asian financial architecture relates to the choice of 
exchange rate regime. Prior to the crisis in 1997 and 1998, Thailand and other regional economies 
were supposed to have pegged the values of their currencies to a basket comprising the US dollar, 
the yen and other currencies, with the weights depending on the linkages with Southeast Asian 
countries. However, the reality was that the US dollar carried an overwhelming weight which led 
to talk of a “dollar standard” or “soft dollar zone” (Tables 5 and 6). Significantly, the Japanese yen 
had a weight of less than 0.1 in the average Southeast Asian currency basket in spite of the fact 
that Japan was the region’s largest export market and largest creditor. The rather rigid pegging to 
the US dollar is widely perceived as having contributed to the 1997-98 crisis. But what is the 
appropriate lesson to draw from this experience and have the appropriate policy changes been 
made?. 
The consensus view was that experience favored the extremes and disfavored the middle 
ground (see Bird, 2002 and Rajan, 2002b are references cited therein). The 1990s had been 
characterized by a series of economic crises that had frequently been associated with attempts by 
governments to defend pegged exchange rates in conditions of evaporating credibility. According 
to this view, countries should choose either immutably fixed exchange rates, in the form of close 
monetary union, where credibility is assured, or for free floating, where there is no commitment to 
any particular exchange rate. They should not opt for any regimes lying in between these two 
poles. This consensus has been reflected by a series of reports about international monetary reform 
that basically say as much
12. However there is another point of view suggesting that this is an 
illegitimate response to the crises of the 1990s and that intermediate solutions have not lost all 
their appeal; at the same time the polar extremes may have their own problems. This implies that 
inappropriate conclusions may have been drawn from the evidence. It may be unwise to assume 
                                                           
12 See for example a report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (1999), dealing with reforming the 
international financial architecture advises developing countries to ‘just say no’ to pegged exchange rates. Similar 





that these “corner solutions” will necessarily avoid future crises. A debate about a new Asian 
financial architecture needs to be more subtle on the issue of the choice of exchange regime. 
 
4.1  The Flexible Exchange Rate Option  
4.1.1  Reasons to Favor Flexibility  
A priori, there are a number of issues that underlie a preference for a greater degree of exchange 
rate flexibility.  
First, the greater the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regime, the keener the incentives 
for agents to undertake appropriate foreign currency risk management techniques in response to the 
higher element of exchange rate risk, while simultaneously reducing the extent of moral hazard which 
could lead to “excessive” unhedged external borrowing (so-called “fixed exchange rate bubble”). The 
introduction of these transactions costs and exchange rate risks may also help moderate the extent of 
capital inflows, consequently dampening the intensity of boom and bust cycles. 
Second, banks tend to dominate the financial systems in the region, and the credit transmission 
channel plays a significant role in these countries. Calvo (1999) has shown that, ceteris paribus, the 
operation of this credit channel (which affects the IS curve directly and acts as a real shock) could tilt the 
balance in favor of greater exchange rate flexibility.  
Third, small and open economies are far more susceptible to large external shocks, such as 
changes in foreign interest rates, terms of trade, regional contagion effects and the like. Received theory 
tells us that a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility is called for in the presence of external or 
domestic real shocks. By acting as a safety valve, flexible exchange rates provide a less costly 
adjustment mechanism by which relative prices can be altered in response to such shocks, as opposed to 
fixed rates which rely on gradual reductions in relative costs via deflation and productivity increases vis-
à-vis trade partners to restore internal balance. This manner of adjustment to shocks can be prolonged 
and extremely costly. Altering the exchange rate is one means of attempting to engender economic 
adjustment. The need to adjust will depend on the incidence of macroeconomic disequilibria
13. Related 
                                                           
13 Three points should be noted here. One, empirical evidence suggests that pass through of devaluation is 




to this, many of the East Asian economies have diversified trade structures (dependent on the US, Japan, 
Europe and intra-Asian trade). Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria suggest that such economies are 
good candidates to maintain more flexible regimes. (We take this important issue of adjustment to 
external shocks up again in Section 4.2) 
Fourth, it is often suggested that a rigid basket peg may operate as a nominal anchor for 
monetary policy and be a way of introducing some degree of financial discipline domestically and 
breaking inflationary inertia (Bird and Rajan, 2000a and Edwards, 1993). Thus, a multicountry study of 
136 countries over the period 1960-89 conducted by Ghosh et al. (1995) found that inflation rates 
generally tend to be greater and more volatile under more flexible regimes, though economic growth is 
less volatile. An IMF (1997) study of 123 developing countries covering the period 1975-96 arrives at a 
broadly similar conclusion, viz. the median inflation rate of “peggers” has been consistently lower and 
less volatile than those with more flexible arrangements, though the inflation rate differential between 
the two sets of countries has decreased through the 1990s
14. However, Glick et al. (1999) have argued 
that policies of pegging exchange rates in East Asia were of little benefit in terms of acting as a counter-
inflationary device, this goal having been attained primarily due to other factors such as relative 
autonomy of the monetary authorities. In their view, the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors may 
actually have acted as a liability as it prevented the necessary adjustments in response to external shocks. 
In addition, both theory and lessons of experience with nominal anchors have shown that such pegging 
loses credibility over time and induces booms followed by inevitable busts and crises (Bird and Rajan, 
2000a). Pegging the exchange rate constrains monetary independence
15. If monetary and fiscal policies 
have proved effective in the past, governments may be reluctant to constrain their ability to use them in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
have real effects in the short-term during non-crisis periods. Devaluation during crisis periods appears to be 
contractionary rather than expansionary (Hausmann et al., 2000 and Rajan and Shen, 2001). Three, repeated 
devaluations will only have price effects without any real effects as they come to be anticipated by the private 
sector. 
14 While these studies are instructive, they are no means conclusive as they do not account for the possibility of 
endogeneity of the choice exchange rate regimes. Specifically, we cannot be sure as to whether a fixed exchange 
rate actually leads to lower inflation or whether countries which experience low inflation rates adopt such a regime. 
 
15 Conversely, if unrestrained monetary policy has been a facet of the country’s past, imposing exchange rate fixity 
may be an advantage as it constrains the active use of monetary policy. However, recent empirical evidence casts 
doubt on the extent to which floating regimes in developing countries provides insulation from foreign interest rate 





the future by targeting a particular exchange rate. The choice therefore depends on the relative merits of 
alternative macroeconomic policy instruments. 
Fifth, there is a widespread belief that a pegged regime induces increased policy discipline, as 
fiscal profligacy will lead to a reserve depletion or burgeoning debt and an eventual currency collapse. 
However, the effects of unsound macro policies become evident immediately under flexible rates 
through exchange rate and price level movements (i.e. depreciation-inflation spiral). Thus, flexible 
rates ought to instill greater fiscal restraint/discipline, as the costs of macroeconomic policy 
transgressions have to be paid upfront. In other words, the key distinction between fixed and floating 
rates is in the intertemporal distribution of costs and benefits (Tornell and Velasco, 2000). Gavin and 
Perotti (1997) have provided some empirical validity to this argument. After controlling for a host of 
other factors, they find that Latin American fiscal policies were more prudent under flexible rates than 
under floating ones. 
 
4.1.2  Reasons for a “Fear of Floating” 
 
Despite the preceding arguments favoring a flexible exchange rate regime, countries with 
flexible regimes appear to have experienced “excessive” volatility over the last few decades
16. It is 
admittedly difficult to define exactly what is meant by the term “excessive”. However, a reading of 
the literature on available empirical studies of exchange rates reveals that evidence of excessive 
exchange rate variability comes in a number of forms (Bird and Rajan, 2001a,b and Williamson, 
1999a). For instance, a number of surveys of foreign exchange market participants clearly indicate 
that short-term/high-frequency exchange rate movements are caused by “speculative” or “trend-
following” elements rather than underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The problem of 
destabilizing speculation and consequent excessive exchange rate volatility appears to be 
exacerbated in developing countries, making a flexible regime especially unviable/unsuitable to 
them (Grenville and Gruen, 1999). This is particularly so since thin markets, which exist in 
Southeast Asia and other developing countries (Table 7), imply that a few transactions can lead to 
extreme exchange rate fluctuations.  
Even if it were accepted that flexible exchange rates often appear to exhibit greater volatility 
in high frequency data than would be warranted by the underlying fundamentals, why might such 
excessive volatility be of concern? Recent studies have provided evidence of a negative impact of 
                                                           
16 Of course, almost no country has maintained a completely free (or pure) float, the authorities intervening 
intermittently to smooth market fluctuations. In other words “dirty floats” - i.e. foreign exchange market 
interventions without commitment to defend any specific parity - have been the norm. The US dollar probably 





exchange rate volatility/uncertainty on investment (Corbo and Cox, 1995 and Huizinga, 1994)17. To 
the extent that investment has a significant positive impact on economic growth, declining investment 
will have an enduring adverse effect on the quantity of real resources. Even in the absence of a 
negative effect on the level of investment, exchange rate variability may have an adverse influence 
over the composition of investment since decisions could be based on disequilibrium prices.  
It has often been argued that firms and other agents involved in international transactions can 
undertake hedging operations to shield themselves against exchange rate movements. However, apart 
from the costs involved with such operations, perfect hedges may be very difficult to create 
technically (given acute revenue-cost uncertainties) (Adler, 1996 and Friberg, 1996). Indeed, even if 
they could be created, they would entail non-negligible transaction costs, thus diverting scarce 
resources from “real” economic activity. This is especially true in the case of developing countries 
where rudimentary capital markets have necessitated using cross-hedging techniques (rather than 
direct hedging), which invariably are far costlier. According to a 1992 survey of non-financial Fortune 
500 corporations, while 85 per cent of the respondents hedged, only 22 per cent hedged fully. Not 
surprisingly, most of the respondents which did not hedge were smaller firms averaging US$2 billion 
in capital (Felix, 1996 and Felix and Sau, 1996). It is important to keep in mind that such small and 
medium sized enterprises dominate the economic landscape in developing countries. 
  Frankel and Wei (1998) have undertaken a cross-sectional study of bilateral trade. They find 
that bilateral exchange rate variability looks to have had a statistically and economically significant 
negative effect on trade between 1960 and 1985, though the impact - both economic and statistical - 
has been negligible between 1985 and 199018. Wei (1999) provides new empirical evidence suggesting 
that exchange rate volatility has had a detrimental effect on trade between pairs of countries to a much 
larger extent than suggested by previous studies. More generally, in a comprehensive survey of the 
literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows, McKenzie (1999) concludes that the 
                                                           
17 Corbo and Cox (1995) and others also find that macroeconomic uncertainty in general has a deleterious impact 
on investment. Also see the broad literature survey by Serven (1997). 
 
18 On balance, these earlier time-series studies seem to have found an insignificant effect of exchange rate 





recent empirical studies have had “greater success in deriving a statistically significant relationship 
between volatility and trade” (p.100). Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) review a more limited set of such 
studies and draw a similar conclusion. Another recent set of empirics by Andrew Rose based on 
gravity models using both cross-sectional and time series data suggests that institutionally fixed 
exchange regimes in general, but a common currency in particular, stimulate trade, which in turn 
boosts income (see Frankel and Rose, 2001, Glick and Rose, 2001 and Rose, 2000). As is common 
knowledge, proponents of the European Monetary Union (EMU) used such an argument extensively. 
Flexible exchange rates may also be associated with currency misalignments, with accompanying 
costs in terms of resource misallocation and detrimental effects on economic growth.  
  Notwithstanding the recent weakness of the Australian dollar
19, its successful experience with 
a floating arrangement, particularly in terms of withstanding the East Asian crisis, has often been cited 
as evidence of the “superiority” of such a regime, and has sometimes been held up as a model for 
Southeast Asian countries. However, such advocacy does not pay due consideration to the fact that 
there are important structural differences between industrial countries such as Australia, on the one 
hand, and developing countries, on the other (Krugman, 1999). For instance, countries like Australia 
and the US have well-developed and diversified financial systems that are able to minimize real sector 
disruptions due to transitory exchange rate variations (abstracting from the resource allocation costs of 
misalignments noted above). Most importantly, industrial countries are able to borrow overseas in 
their domestic currencies. Many developing countries are unable to do so, leading to accumulation of 
foreign currency debt liabilities that are primarily dollar denominated and unhedged (i.e. “liability 
dollarization”)
20. In such countries, sharp depreciations in their currencies alter the domestic currency 
value of their external debt and therefore the net worth of the economies, with adverse real sector 
                                                           
19 The Australian dollar has lost half its US dollar value between end 1996 and early 2001. The Economist (29 
April, 2000, p.84) discusses reasons behind this. 
 
20 This has come to be referred to as the “original sin” hypothesis, a term attributed to Hausmann (1999) and 
Hausmann et al. (2000). It is unclear why many developing countries are unable to borrow long-term in their own 
currencies. McLean and Shreshta (2001) explore this issue using a case-study approach involving Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa, all small and open economies that borrow internationally in domestic currencies. They 
conclude that countries where domestic long-term government debt is widely held by residents are more likely to 
convince non-residents to hold debt denominated in local currencies. They further suggest that the development of 
the Eurobond markets for debt denominated in Australian dollars, New Zealand dollars and the South African rand 




effects (so-called “balance sheet” effects). This in turn may explain the “fear of floating” exhibited by 
many developing countries. (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a,b and Hausmann, et al., 2000).  This fear has 
in turn led to growing enthusiasm for the other corner solution; an irrevocably fixed regime. Such a 
hard peg, it is argued, signals greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments (i.e. 
“escape clauses” cannot be invoked) and the authorities’ willingness to subordinate domestic policy 
objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. 
Hard pegs can take on a number of forms; would these work in Asia? 
 
4.2  Currency Boards and Dollarization 
The durability of the Hong Kong and Argentine currency boards in the face of acute speculative 
pressures in the 1990s appears to have convinced some observers of the virtues of such a regime for a 
number of developing countries, including those in Southeast Asia. In fact, the Asian Monetary Monitor 
(July-August, 1994, pp.1-10) did suggest such a regime for the regional countries pre-crisis, and 
Indonesia toyed with the idea of this sort of arrangement during the early part of 1998
21. Others argue 
that developing countries should form a monetary union with the US, or more specifically, that they 
ought to abandon their respective national currencies in favor of the US dollar, i.e. dollarization 
(Hausmann, 1999)
22. 
It is generally recognized that such hard pegs require a number of preconditions to be satisfied 
(Frankel, 1999), including a strong and durable domestic financial system that is able to withstand 
possible interest rate hikes on a sustained basis at times when the domestic currency is under selling 
pressure. Failing this, currency crisis vulnerability might merely be transformed to financial sector 
vulnerability (this point is formalized by Chang and Velasco, 1998). To the extent that the banking 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
21 See Culp et al. (1999) in defense of the case for a currency board in Indonesia and Spiegel (1998) for the case 
against. 
 
22 The relative merits of dollarization over a currency board are not discussed here (see Berg and Borensztein, 
2000, Frankel, 1999 and Frankel et al., 2000). Suffice it to note that the major advantage of dollarization is a 
reduction in currency (and possibly even country) risk premium, therefore offering lower domestic interest rates, as 
well as elimination of concerns regarding the sustainability of the domestic currency peg (i.e. no escape clause). 
The major disadvantage of moving from a currency board arrangement to dollarization is the loss of seigniorage, 





systems in the regional countries have been decimated by the crisis, and the process of financial sector 
restructuring - while having progressed substantially – is, as noted in the previous section, far from 
complete, the currency board arrangement alternative appears to be infeasible over the near to medium-
term. This is particularly so since the lender of last resort (LOLR) function of a central bank is 
eliminated by the introduction of a currency board, in turn implying the need for a strong, well-
capitalized and well-supervised domestic financial system
23.  
There is also the question of whether the regional countries have the degree of labor market and 
internal flexibility - as in the case of Hong Kong, for instance - to make such a super fix viable. Failing 
this, a currency board arrangement makes adjustments to large economic shocks extremely costly. In 
such circumstances, forsaking the exchange rate as a policy tool is not an appealing option
24. A great 
deal has been made of Hong Kong’s ability to maintain its US dollar-based currency board arrangement 
in the midst of acute bearish pressure in 1997-98. Much less recognized is the fact that Singapore, which 
pursued a Williamson (1999a)-type monitoring band arrangement pre-crisis, and continues to do so 
post-crisis
25, weathered the East Asian crisis comparatively well despite having extremely strong direct 
trade and financial linkages with most of the crisis-hit regional economies (Rajan, et al., 2002)
26.  
                                                           
23 The loss of a domestic LOLR function may be partly compensated for by holding excess reserves (over and 
above the domestic monetary base), as in the case of Hong Kong, or obtaining access to foreign credit lines as in 
the case of Argentina. A referee points out that the LOLR function need not necessarily be assigned to the 
central bank. What matters in the end is the ability to tax current and future generations and provide current 
liquidity in exchange. As such, this role could lie with an independent fiscal authority. 
 
24 The point is sometimes made that the preconditions are not necessary for the implementation of a 
currency board or dollarization (which overlap considerably). No doubt that dollarization or currency board 
arrangements can be implemented prior to reforms; the key question is, what are the implications of doing 
so?  It is useful to keep in mind that the failure to pay sufficient attention to the pre-conditions for successful 
financial liberalization has been among the main reasons for financial crises in developing countries.   
Eichengreen (2000) provides a detailed review of the dollarization literature and discusses the preconditions 
needed at some length.  
 
25 This is how the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) describes the management of its exchange rate policy. 
MAS manages the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies of Singapore’s main trading 
partners and competitors. The basket is composed of the currencies of those countries that are the 
main sources of imported inflation and competition in export markets…The trade-weighted 
Singapore dollar is allowed to float within an undisclosed target band. The level and width of the 
band are reviewed periodically to ensure that they are consistent with economics fundamentals and 
market conditions. The MAS intervenes in the foreign exchange market from time to time to ensure 
that movements of the..(Singapore dollar) exchange rate are orderly and consistent with the 
exchange rate policy (MAS website: www.mas.gov.sg). 
 
26 While Hong Kong’s overall GDP declined by 5 percent in 1998, Singapore’s growth stagnated in 1998 (0.4 




In addition, it is revealing that both Hong Kong and Argentina themselves have, in recent times, 
been proponents of exploring moves towards alternative hard peg arrangements by their respective 
regions -- dollarization in the case of Latin America and East Asian monetary cooperation or at least 
coordination in the case of Hong Kong. Cynics of currency board arrangements have interpreted this as 
the two economies looking for viable exit strategies from their respective currency boards arrangements. 
The Argentine case is especially revealing. While Argentina’s hard US dollar peg was important in 
helping the country realize financial and monetary stability, the recent large shocks in emerging market 
economies (Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia 1997-98 and Brazil in 1999) required exchange rate 
adjustments, that until January 2002, were not forthcoming. This in turn necessitated extremely painful 
internal adjustment that eventually became a politically unacceptable liability. 
While a policy of formal dollarization may have some merit in Latin America - see Bird 
(2001a), for a review of the issues - the relatively low levels of informal dollarization in Southeast Asian 
(compared with Latin America), on the one hand, and the economically significant role played by Japan 
and the yen in Southeast and the larger East Asia, on the other, implies that dollarization (let alone 
euroization or yenization) may not be a viable option for this region. An important lesson from the East 
Asian crisis of 1997-98 is that if the regional economies had given greater weight to the yen when 
managing their currencies, there would have been lower degrees of regional real exchange rate 
overvaluations following the nearly 50 per cent nominal appreciation of the US dollar relative to the yen 
between June 1995 to April 1997, which in turn led to an appreciation of the regional currencies relative 
to the yen
27. For instance, in the case of Thailand, which was the “crisis trigger country”, various studies 
have suggested that the Thai baht’s pre-crisis real effective exchange rate (REER) was misaligned 
(“overvalued”) by anywhere between 11 and 30 per cent relative to some measure of “equilibrium” real 
exchange rate (Montiel, 1999 and Rajan, 2001a). Institutionalization of the dollar pegs (via a currency 
board or dollarization) would not have helped domestic economic performance to the extent that the 
problem was, at least partly, one of loss of competitiveness. Consistent with this, a recent study of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reason for this difference in growth was that the nominal exchange rate flexibility in Singapore was able to 
cushion some of the negative shock, unlike Hong Kong where adjustments in the real exchange rate had to be 
fully realized via domestic deflation (Rajan and Siregar, 2000).  




export performance by about 100 developing countries to the US, Japan and Europe over the period 
1983-92 concludes that the more flexible the exchange rate regime the better the export performance 
(Nilsson and Nilsson, 2000). However, countries pegging to a composite group of currencies do not 
appear to have under-performed countries with independently floating regimes (data based on official 
IMF classification of exchange rate arrangements, i.e. de jure rather than de facto exchange rate 
regimes, is used).  
 
4.3 Monetary  Union 
Having experienced the turbulence of the regional crisis and against the backdrop of the 
introduction of a single European currency, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have agreed to study the feasibility of a common ASEAN currency system
28. There has 
been much popular discussion in the region about the possibility of forming an Asian Monetary 
Union (AMU). From an economic standpoint, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999a,b) have concluded 
that East Asia may be as close to - or rather, as far away from - being an OCA as Western Europe
29. 
This conclusion is based on an OCA index that takes into account the costs associated with 
asymmetric region-wide shocks as well as the benefits from stabilizing exchange rates with trading 
partners
30. More informally, but in similar vein, the IMF’s Managing Director, Horst Kohler (2001), 
has noted 
trading patterns and geography do make it reasonable to think of the creation of an 
internal market in Asia as a possible, future stage in regional cooperation. And why 
should this not be a basis for greater monetary integration… (p.4) 
 
However, there are at least two important differences between East Asia and Europe. First, in 
the absence of sufficiently frictionless intraregional labor mobility, any form of regional monetary union 
requires that there be compensating fiscal transfers from the richer to less well off states. In the case of 
Europe, the extent of such transfers is quite significant in per capita terms for the poorer states, but fairly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
28 Announced as part of the latest ASEAN summit meeting in Hanoi and included in the “Hanoi Plan of Action” 
(Business Times, Singapore, 15 December, 1998). 
29 Similarly, Rockoff (2000) has emphasized that the US could be said to have been an OCA only around the 





low in absolute terms as the richer states in Europe are much larger than the poorer ones (Eichengreen 
and Bayoumi, 1999a,b). This is in contrast to developing East Asia where the poorer regional members 
also happen to be the largest ones (Indonesia and China versus Singapore).  
Second, the European experience has emphasized the need for strong political will and 
consensus towards such a policy goal. Indeed, some like Goodhart (1995) dispute the relevance of 
economic criteria altogether, claiming that political considerations dominate the formation of currency 
areas. While such a political consensus may gradually emerge in Southeast and the larger East Asian 
region, it is still some way off.  “Vision statements” by regional leaders in favor of currency union, 
while becoming more common since the crisis, have hitherto not been backed up by any serious 
discussion of the type of institutional structures or the formal mechanisms and decision-making bodies 
needed for such regional economic integration (such as an independent region-wide central bank, a 
system of inter-regional fiscal transfers, and measures to ensure macroeconomic convergence). 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999b) have noted   
there is little sign, comparable to the evidence which has existed in Europe for nearly 
50 years, of a willingness to subordinate national prerogatives to some larger regional 
entity, There is no wider web of interlocking arrangements, as in the EU, which would 




Thus, the general conclusion offered by Kenen (2000) that the problems of governance and 
accountability may prove inseparable for most other groups of countries outside Europe appears 
especially pertinent to East Asia.  
 
4.4  Revealed Preferences of Regional Central Banks 
What exchange rate policies have been pursued in the region in the post-crisis period? Is there 
any evidence of the so-called “fear of floating”.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
30 In any case, it is possible that OCA criteria may be at least partly endogenous, suggesting that some unions may 
be more justifiable ex post rather than ex ante (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
31 In addition, substantial asymmetries in the sizes and levels and stages of economic development of the countries 
in East Asia, on the one hand, and the de facto policy of strict non-intervention in one another’s affairs (economic 
and particularly political), on the other, makes it extremely difficult to envisage the successful introduction of “tie-





The Malaysian case is the most straightforward, with the government fixing the Malaysian 
ringitt (RM) relative to the US dollar on September 1, 1998 at RM 3.80 per US$ (Athukorala, 2001 and 
Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). More interesting and somewhat more complicated are the exchange rate 
choices of the other three regional countries. It is commonly believed that Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand have maintained a float following their respective currency devaluations. In actuality, after a 
short flirtation with floating following the initial breakdown of currency pegs in mid 1997, the regional 
monetary authorities appear to have reverted to heavy management of their currencies to ensure some 
degree of stability vis-à-vis the US dollar. To be sure, there has certainly been a generalized move 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility during the post-crisis period. This is discernible from Figure 1 
and is empirically confirmed by Hernandez and Montiel (2001). However, while the Malaysian capital 
controls have allowed for the simultaneous maintenance of monetary autonomy and a fixed rate regime, 
the other countries have depended on a combination of activist interest rate policy and foreign exchange 
market intervention to ensure relative exchange rate stability. Consequently, they have experienced 
sharp gyrations in monetary variables and international reserves (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a,b, 
Hernandez and Montiel, 2001 and McKinnon, 2001). Consistent with this, it is useful to note the 
following statement by Thailand's finance minister, Pridiyathorn Devakula. 
(W)e are using the stabilised exchange rate as one of the guiding principles. Why do we 
have to use this? It’s simple - there are two extremes: fixed exchange rate and clean 
float…(M)y attitude to fixed exchange rates - don’t do it. If you do, you invite trouble 
and finally lose all your reserves. The other is clean float. If we were strong like the 
U.S., Japan, Germany we would go clean float. Because a clean float rate can swing to 
extremes, it can savage our current account. When the economy is weakening and 
confidence of private businessmen is not that high, we must make sure our currency 
does not swing to the extreme where it creates panic. That’s why we have to choose the 
middle road (Far Eastern Economic Review, July 26, 2001, pp.50-1). 
 
More evidence of this disinclination to allow the exchange rate to float freely is given by the 
fact that the regional economies began re-accumulating international reserve holdings following the 
sharp declines in 1997. East Asian economies have rapidly built up international reserves in the post 
crisis period so-called “floating with a life-jacket” (Hernandez and Montiel, 2001 and Yung, 2001 and 
Figure 2). The replenishment and accumulation of international reserves, on the one hand, as well as 
the lengthening of the average maturity profile of external indebtedness of the regional economies 




of volatile and easily reversible capital flows
32. Nonetheless, recent weaknesses in the regional 
currencies and the desire by the central banks to offset at least part of the currency declines (vis-à-vis 
the US dollar) have led to a slight drain in reserves in some of the regional economies since late 2000 
(Figure 2 again and ARIC, 2001). 
Summing up, Hernandez and Montiel (2001), who analyze the evidence regarding post-crisis 
exchange rate policies pursued in the Asia-5 economies, conclude as follows. 
(C)ontrary to the views of some observers…there has indeed been a change in de facto 
exchange rate regimes in all five of these countries between the pre- and post-crisis 
periods. While none of them have adopted “soft pegs” with unfettered capital 
movements, neither have they moved to the extreme corner solutions of “hard” pegs or 
clean floats. In other words, all of them have continued to manage their exchange rates in 
an active manner, and have thus occupied the supposed “hollow middle” of exchange 
rate policy” (p.16). 
 
 
4.5   Choice of Exchange Rate Regime Reconsidered 
But what exchange rate regime should form part of an evolving Asian financial architecture? 
The preceding discussion leads to the rather unsatisfying conclusion that when it comes to the choice of 
appropriate exchange rate regime, all that can really be said is that there exists a broad spectrum of 
choice. It is not a black-or-white issue; shades of gray abound
33. Frankel (1999) has provided us with 
two timely reminders: (i) the “Impossible Trinity or Trilogy” does not on its own imply that in an 
increasingly globalized world economy an intermediate regime is unviable; (ii) few developing 
countries appear to meet the OCA criteria to make either corner solution an ideal choice and “one size 
does not fit all” (also see Kenen, 2000 and Willett, 2001 and Bird, 2002). 
Choosing the exchange rate regime should represent a consistent part of a coherent 
macroeconomic strategy. If not viewed in this way, any regime is likely to fail because inconsistencies 
will arise. No exchange rate regime will deliver stability if domestic macroeconomic policy is unsound, 
with large fiscal deficits, rapid monetary growth and inflation. Pegged exchange rates will become 
                                                           
32 The extent of short-term indebtedness has been found to be a key indicator of (il)liquidity and a robust predictor 
of financial crises (Bussiere and Mulder, 1999, Dadush et al., 2000, Rodrik and Velasco, 1999 and World Bank, 
1999). According to Dadush et al., on the basis of data for 33 developing economies, the elasticity of short-term 
debt with GDP growth is 0.9 when there is a positive shock to output and -1.8 when there is a negative shock. This 
extreme reversibility of short-term debt in the event of negative shock exposes borrowers to liquidity runs and 
systemic crises. In a somewhat contrarian view, Jeanne (2000) argues that it is not clear that short-term debt 
contracts ought to be discouraged as they may play a socially advantageous function in reducing agency problems.  




overvalued and reserves will fall, while flexible exchange rates will depreciate and may result in crises 
just as much as pegged regimes. Exchange rate policy in emerging economies may need to have a more 
limited objective. Rather than focusing on disciplining domestic macroeconomic policy and labor 
markets, perhaps the exchange rate regime should be designed in the first instance to minimize exposure 
to the third currency phenomenon, where the problem for emerging economies arises from fluctuations 
in the values of the currencies of their major trading partners against each other.  
In the absence of strong capital controls, currency intervention ought not be framed as a 
specific target for the exchange rate. Such targets inevitably tempt speculators by offering them the 
infamous one-way option. Thus, exchange rate and monetary policy strategies must involve an 
element of flexibility rather than a single-minded defense of a particular rate. This might best be 
achieved by a Singapore-type variant on sliding parities and wider bands around an appropriately 
weighted currency basket, (a so-termed band-basket-crawl or BBC)
34 or a more flexible exchange rate 
combined with an inflation target.
35 Neither of these strategies supports the benign neglect of the 
exchange rate. 
 
5.     Regional Liquidity Arrangements 
5.1  Financial Crisis and the Importance of Liquidity 
  Currency crisis models suggest the circumstances under which exchange rates are likely to 
come under speculative attack (Rajan, 2001). If the authorities wish to prevent the full impact of 
the selling of a currency on its value they have to buy it. In order to do so they need foreign 
exchange, and this may come from decumulating international reserves or from foreign borrowing. 
The problem is that reserve decumulation has a finite limit and private capital, by definition, will 
be exiting. It is in these circumstances that developing and emerging economies may be forced to 
turn to the IMF.  
  An important dimension of any crisis is likely to be illiquidity. Illiquidity can create crises 
even where the economic fundamentals are sound, or it can make a bad situation worse when the 
fundamentals are weak. Moreover once it becomes a problem, illiquidity further undermines the 
                                                           
34 The crawl is meant to compensate for inflation differentials. Williamson (1999a) discusses the BBC policy in 
some detail and Williamson (1999b) and Rajan (2002b) explore this option for East Asia. 
 
35 Many central banks that purport to operate an inflation target, actually pursue a flexible version of it. This is 
clear by the fact that in most cases the official monetary policy stance is captured by a “Monetary Conditions 
Index” or MCI which is a weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate. Eichengreen (2001a) 
discusses definitions and issues surrounding a monetary policy strategy organized around an inflation target in 




confidence of international capital markets. Capital outflows increase, thereby reducing liquidity 
still further. Currency crisis models have shown that once countries fall below some liquidity 
threshold matters can deteriorate rapidly (Chang and Velasco, 1998). Although there continues to 
be a debate about the extent to which fundamentals accounted for the East Asian crisis, there is 
little doubt that illiquidity was a part of the problem. Prior to the crisis, capital inflows exceeded 
current account balance of payments deficits and this allowed international reserves to be 
accumulated. However, as capital markets lost confidence, capital inflows all of a sudden became 
capital outflows and the reserves were run down as a way of financing current account deficits. As 
reserves were depleted, so confidence declined still further; a trickle became a flood, and countries 
in the region were forced to turn to the IMF for financial assistance. 
  Although large in relation to the Fund's normal lending, the loans from the IMF did not 
come close to fully compensating for the outflows of private capital and this implied the need to 
switch from a policy of financing current account deficits to one of correcting them. The speed and 
intensity of economic adjustment was largely dictated by the shortage of liquidity. Indeed, it was 
the extreme shortage of liquidity that called for rapid adjustment. Empirical research confirms the 
a priori reasoning that the intensity of adjustment in East Asia in 1998 by comparison with other 
periods reflected the shortage of liquidity
36. 
  Some indication of the degree of adjustment may be gleaned from examining what 
happened to output and real exchange exchange rates following the financial crisis, (Figures 3 and 
4). Traditional balance of payments theory distinguishes between expenditure-switching and 
expenditure-changing policies, and it is tempting to portray exchange rate devaluation (the classic 
expenditure-switching device) as an alternative to contractionary expenditure policies. If this was 
the case, it might be supposed that the East Asian economies would have experienced a sharp fall 
in the values of their currencies or a sharp fall in output but not both together. But as things turned 
out the balance sheet effects of devaluation for the domestic financial and corporate sectors seem 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
36 Thus, Eichengreen and Rose (2001) argue that the East Asian process of – “V-shaped” - adjustment has not been 
very different from the stylized patterns of precious currency crisis episodes in developing countries. However, the 




to have created temporary but sharp recessionary repercussions as there was a rapid rise in the 
domestic currency cost of servicing obligations denominated in foreign currencies, and a domestic 
liquidity crunch (Bird and Rajan, 2000c,Boorman et al., 2000, Krugman, 2001, Rajan and Shen, 
2001). To the extent that the recessionary effects of devaluation were underestimated at the time, 
contractionary aggregate demand management policies would have resulted in recession over-kill. 
Judged against potential output (real GDP) for each economy, the IMF has estimated that the 
cumulative output losses from the 1997-98 crisis were much larger than those following the 
Tequila crisis in Latin America in 1994 (Table 9). The question then becomes whether these output 
losses could have been reduced. This brings us back to the trade-off between the severity of 
adjustment in the short run and the availability of international liquidity.  
 
5.2  International Liquidity, Crisis Prevention and the IMF 
  As already noted, illiquidity, lack of confidence, and self-fulfilling expectations create a 
highly combustible cocktail. But, by the same token, where liquidity is perceived to be adequate, 
confidence might be maintained and the self-fulfillment of expectations may mean that liquidity is 
adequate. It has long been recognized that inadequate liquidity can threaten the stability of 
international financial regimes. Thus, during the 1960s, the prime concern relating to the Bretton 
Woods international financial system was the widely perceived shortage of international liquidity. A 
sequence of reforms designed to increase international liquidity culminating in the introduction of the 
IMF’s own international reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR), were aimed at shoring up 
the Bretton Woods system by reducing its vulnerability to crisis. Prior to the establishment of the SDR 
the IMF attempted to provide quick-disbursing low conditionality finance through lower credit 
tranche drawings and through its Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) which was designed to help 
countries deal with problems caused by exogenous shortfalls in export earnings. While the CFF was 
designed with developing countries in mind, the industrial countries developed a system of bilateral 
swap arrangements within which countries encountering a speculative crisis threatening the durability 
of their exchange rate peg could swap domestic currency for foreign currency with other central banks 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




- a transaction that was reversed after the speculative attack had been repelled and the crisis had 
passed. Ultimately industrial countries no longer needed to turn to the IMF for assistance because they 
managed to develop sources of liquidity that they deemed preferable.  
  An obvious method of enhancing a country’s liquidity position is via the accumulation of 
international reserves. As Fischer (2001c) notes 
Reserves matter because they are a key determinant of a country's ability to avoid 
economic and financial crisis. This is true of all countries, but especially of emerging 
markets open to volatile international capital flows…The availability of capital flows 
to offset current account shocks should, on the face of it, reduce the amount of 
reserves a country needs. But access to private capital is often uncertain, and inflows 
are subject to rapid reversals, as we have seen all too often in recent years. We have 
also seen in the recent crises that countries that had big reserves by and large did 
better in withstanding contagion than those with smaller reserves.. (pp.1-3). 
 
An important limitation of such a reserve-hoarding policy is that it involves high fiscal costs 
as the country effectively swaps high yielding domestic assets for lower yielding foreign ones
37. In 
addition, since the size of international reserve holdings has been found to be a theoretically and 
statistically significant determinant of creditworthiness (Bussiere and Mulder, 1999, Haque, 1996 and 
Disyatat, 2001), depleting them as a way of cushioning the effect of capital outflows on the exchange 
rate may make matters worse by inducing further capital outflows. If capital outflows reflect a 
perception within private capital markets that a country is illiquid, reducing international reserves and 
therefore curbing liquidity further is hardly likely to be an effective strategy. In other words, the 
reversibility that makes reserve depletion credible in the context of current account deficits is often 
absent in the context of capital outflows. 
  From a government’s perception an advantage associated with international reserves is that 
they may be used quickly and without conditions. This may also appear to be the case with financing 
from private capital markets. But while private capital inflows may again logically be used to finance 
temporary current account balance of payments deficits, the logic breaks down when the crisis is 
                                                           
37 There is the additional question of what the appropriate size of reserve holdings is; against what yardstick 
should reserve adequacy be measured? The generally accepted rule of thumb that a country needs to hold 
reserve equivalent to short-term debt cover (i.e. debt that actually falls due over the year) is true only in the case 
where a country is running a current account balance and there are no other liabilities that are easily reversible 
(Fischer, 2001c). The optimal level of reserves depends on a number of factors such as degree of export 
diversification, size and variability of the current account imbalance and type of exchange rate regime operated 
(Bussiere and Mulder, 1999). A related issue pertains to the appropriate currency composition of reserves in 
terms of currency composition (Eichengreen and Mathieson, 2000). Steps have been taken to improve IMF’s 
analytical framework for management of international reserves as well as to assess a country’s external financial 




connected to the capital account
38. In this case, it is capital outflows that are part of the problem. 
Countries will be losing creditworthiness and their consequent access to private capital markets. 
Liquidity-based policies will instead need to be directed towards arresting the outflow of capital. In 
the midst of the crisis there is no guarantee that conventional wisdom relating to the capital account 
will apply. Thus raising the rate of interest may transmit a negative signal about the state of the 
economy and its future prospects and may lead to further capital outflows
39. A fall in the value of the 
currency may enhance expectations of a further fall with a similar outcome.  
  Provision of external financing may, for these reasons, be seen by some as a “public good” 
and as being appropriately supplied by the IMF
40. Fischer (2001a) has stressed the need for a 
multilateral response in the form of IMF lending to complement unilateral measures that countries 
may take towards liquidity enhancement so as to solve the first-mover problem, whereby no single 
creditor or investor is ready to extend the first offer of funds to a crisis economy
41. As noted earlier, 
the IMF used to possess a quick-disbursing low conditionality lending window (the CFF) designed to 
provide liquidity in the event of trade-related current account deficits. However, the trend since the 
1980s has been towards greater conditionality and this, almost by definition, reduces the speed with 
which liquidity may be disbursed. By the time a Fund program has been negotiated the internal 
dynamics of a crisis may be well established and therefore more difficult to break. Combined with the 
sheer size of capital movements as opposed to budget and trade deficits, the IMF may therefore be 
                                                           
38 In recognition of the urgent need to further study and understand the workings and dynamics of international 
capital markets and flows, the IMF recently established a new International Capital Markets Department. The 
former Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, was perhaps among the first to emphasise capital 
account factors as being the drivers behind recent financial crises in emerging and developing countries in 1995 
when he referred to the Mexican crisis of 1994-94 as “the first financial crisis of the twenty-first century” (see 
Buira, 1999). 
 
39 There is a burgeoning literature on the interest rate impact on exchange rates and capital flows during a crisis 
period. For instance, see Furman and Stiglitz (1998). 
 
40 Of course, another alternative open to individual governments is private lines of credit with international banks. 
We discuss these in the next subsection. 
 
41 As Eichengreen (2001c) notes   
In the climate of uncertainty that invariably surrounds a crisis, waiting has option value. Investors 
have an incentive to wait and see whether the commitment to reform is sustained instead of being 
first to provide new money. New money may increase the likelihood of success -- interest rates 
will come down, making it more likely that growth will resume -- but organizing the provision of 
those funds must surmount the free rider problem in which each investor prefers other investors to 




struggling to provide significant financial support, even though the absolute amount of lending to 
countries encountering capital account crises may put strains on the Fund’s own resources.  
One of the problems facing the Fund, which has constituted one component of the debate 
about a new international financial architecture, has been how to provide adequate liquidity to help 
forestall and, if needed, help deal with crises where there is reluctance to make concessions in terms 
of conditionality and reluctance to substantially increase the Fund’s lending capacity. The Fund’s 
response has been to create the Contingent Credit Line (CCL). The idea here was to establish a 
precautionary line of credit for countries that might be affected by contagion from a crisis, and to 
finance this from outside the Fund’s quota-based resources by new arrangements to borrow (NAB). 
The negotiation of conditionality with potential users of the CCL would therefore take place before 
the country needed to draw on the Fund. However, no country has negotiated a CCL . Its weaknesses 
have been widely recognized and acknowledged and the facility has undergone some modifications in 
late 2000, including a reduction in the relatively high costs of borrowing from it and a review of the 
conditionality involved as part of obtaining the funding (Bird, 2001b, Fischer, 2001a, IMF, 2001b and 
Willett, 2001b). 
However, this sort of “tinkering” fails to recognize a more fundamental drawback of such a 
scheme. Why should countries sacrifice sovereignty over national policy and subject themselves to 
strict conditionality when all they receive in return is an option on a drawing? Since, in many cases, 
countries fail to implement conditionality for one reason or another, a situation could arise where a 
country complies with a significant proportion of conditionality and yet is ineligible to draw in the 
event of experiencing contagion from a crisis. Of most concern though has been the possibility that by 
negotiating a CCL a country sends out a negative signal to private capital markets that it is vulnerable 
to a crisis. The range of ex ante conditionality may paint a bleak picture of what is wrong. This may 
have an adverse effect on capital flows and may contribute to causing the very crisis that the CCL is 
intended to help avoid. Moreover, there must remain some doubt about whether the facility would be 





42. And advanced economies may therefore remain reluctant to provide finance when 
they may perceive the CCL as conferring few benefits on them (Chang and Rajan, 2001).  
This raises the question of whether the principle of subsidiarity suggests that a regional 
system of contingent credit lines should be established in similar vein to the bilateral swaps used to 
support pegged exchange rates during the Bretton Woods era. There are signs that this is the direction 
in which the Asian economies are moving.  
 
5.3  Self-Help Mechanisms in Asia 
5.3.1  Unilateral Liquidity Enhancing Policies 
As previously noted, to some extent economies in Asia have strengthened their international 
liquidity positions by replenishing and accumulating reserves as well as by lengthening the average 
maturity of their external indebtedness. This, along with the introduction of relatively greater 
flexibility in the exchange rate regimes, may have eased their vulnerability to the destabilizing effects 
of volatile capital flows
43. However, it does not mean that liquidity in the region is now adequate to 
avoid future crises. Moreover, as the economies of the region continue to recover from the 1997-98 
crisis, imports will rise and current account surpluses will tend to fall; the rate of accumulation of 
international reserves will therefore also decline. In any case, as noted earlier, beyond a certain point 
reserve accumulation is likely to be an inefficient way of creating liquidity. Since liquidity may only 
be needed in certain sets of circumstances, as in the event of sudden outflows of private capital, 
contingent credit lines may be a better way of trying to deal with the problem. Are there other ways in 
which contingent credit lines could be established outside the IMF?  
                                                           
 
42 For instance, in a recent study using a sample of 20 countries covering the periods of the 1982 Mexican debt 
crisis, the 1994-95 Tequila crisis and the 1997-98 Asian crisis, De Gregario and Valdes (1999) found contagion to 
be directly dependent on geographical horizon. Using a panel of annual data for 19 developing economies for the 
period 1977-93, Krueger et al (2000) concluded that a currency crisis in a regional economy raises the probability 
of a speculative attack on the domestic currency by about 8.5 percent points. All of this provides rationale for 
developing regionally based contingent credit facilities to buttress reserve holdings of individual countries so as to 
prevent sudden credit contraction due to a liquidity crisis. 
 
43 Of course, Malaysia is the exception, having introduced a system of capital controls along with a fixed peg to the 
US dollar. 




Some emerging economies including Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa have 
recently arranged private lines of credit with international banks. However, there are a number of 
problems with such privately contracted credit lines (Rajan, 2002d). First, there may be high 
opportunity costs involved insofar as the individual countries have to commit certain assets/revenue 
streams as collateral. Second, calling on these lines of credit when needed could lead to a hike in the 
country’s international risk premium. Third, while negotiating lines of credit with a country, the 
financial institutions could undermine the effectiveness of these commitments and their net exposures 
to that country via other channels (through various corporate risk management techniques). Foreign 
banks themselves could be a source of contagious transmission of crises. For instance, in response to a 
crisis in one country, multinational banks might attempt to liquidate positions in other regional 
economies to which they are exposed either to enhance overall liquidity or reduce (perceived) 
portfolio risks. Eichengreen (2001b) provides an illuminating discussion of the inefficacy of such 
private CCLs in the context of Argentina’s recent experience
44.  
 
5.3.2 Monetary  Cooperation 
Suffice it to note here that the regional dimension of the 1997-98 financial crisis as well as the 
perceived inadequacies of the IMF’s response to it, has motivated East Asian economies to explore 
regionally based institutional alternatives. A sub-group of East Asian economies have taken some 
small but noteworthy steps towards enhancing regional financial stability and protecting themselves 
against externally induced shocks and liquidity crises. The establishment of the Manila Framework 
group (MFG), the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) which is managed by the newly created 
ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit (ASCU), as well as the recently formed Regional Economic 
Monitoring Unit (REMU) of the ADB, are all steps in the right direction. These initiatives have been 
discussed in some detail by Chang and Rajan (1999, 2001), Rajan (2000), Manzano (2001) and others, 
and will not be repeated here. While initiatives towards enhanced regional surveillance are important 
in their own right, they do not guarantee that capital account crises will be avoided. Access to 
international credit lines may still be required. 
Against this background, and in recognition of the fact that financial stability has the 
characteristics of a regional public good, it is important to note that selected East Asian economies 
have recently agreed to create a network of bilateral currency swaps and repurchase agreements as a 
“firewall” against future financial crises. This has since come to be termed the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI) following an agreement in Chiang-Mai, Thailand on May 6, 2000.  
In broad terms, the CMI is aimed at providing countries facing the possibility of a liquidity 
shortage with additional short-term hard currencies. The CMI extends and expands upon the little 
known ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) and encompasses all ASEAN countries as well as China, 
                                                           




Japan and Korea (i.e. ASEAN Plus Three or APT). The ASA was established in the 1970s to provide 
short-term swap facilities to members facing temporary liquidity or balance of payments problems. In 
1977, there were only five ASEAN signatories - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand - each contributing about US$ 40 million. This facility was increased to US$200 million in 
1978. At the Fourth ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting in Brunei Darussalam (March 24-45, 2000), 
the Ministers agreed to expand the ASA to include the remaining ASEAN members, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. In keeping with this expansion, the ASA 
was enlarged to US$ 1 billion with effect from November 17, 2000. There are also a series of 
repurchase agreements (repos) that allow ASEAN members with collateral such as US Treasury bills 
to swap them for hard currency (usually US dollars) and then repurchase them at a later date. The 
expanded ASA is to be made available for two years and is renewable upon mutual agreement of the 
members. Each member is allowed to draw a maximum of twice its commitment from the facility for 
a period of up to six months with the possibility of a further extension of not more than six months. 
This expansion of the ASA is the first step in putting into effect the CMI, which envisages 
that hard currency lines of credit will be made available to members. In addition to the expansion of 
the ASA among Southeast Asian countries, the three ASEAN Dialogue partners (China, Japan and 
Korea) have simultaneously been in discussions aimed at establishing a bilateral swap arrangement 
(BSA) amongst themselves. Japan has recently signed BSAs totaling US$6 billion with Malaysia, 
Thailand and Korea, and is planning to add ones with China and the Philippines. BSAs among other 
members of the APT are expected in the near future
45. While the maximum amount of withdrawal 
under each of the BSAs will be determined by negotiations between the two countries concerned, in 
the spirit of regional partnership there is planned to be full coordination and consultation among all 
members when deciding on disbursements. While the basic idea behind the CMI is clear, the details 
still need to be clarified. Journalistic accounts suggest that 10 percent of the funds will be available 
automatically while the rest will be subject to IMF conditionality. Other details of the new swap 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
as a poster child of how to establish good “investor relations” in the 1990s. 
45 While Singapore is a contributor to the ASA, it has announced its intention not to sign bilateral swap 





arrangements, such as the type of collateral that may be required for hard currency loans, the interest 
rate to be charged, and the number of withdrawals that can be made, are not yet known. However 
,economic analysis helps to identify some broad principles that need to be incorporated in the 
initiative. First, the resources need to be capable of being disbursed quickly. Speed is of the essence in 
a crisis. Second, the credit lines need to be “sufficiently large” as to generate confidence in private 
capital markets and to repel speculative attacks, as well as involving sufficient countries to avoid 
potential problems of co-variance and to allow the pooling of risks. Nonetheless, it remains an open 
issue as to what is meant by “sufficiently large”, or as Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001) note, “how large is 
large”?
 46. It is unclear as to whether the existing swaps are sufficient to tackle future capital reversals. 
Indeed, during the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the ASA was not even activitated as the financing levels 
available through these channels were considered grossly insufficient in the face of the massive 
capital withdrawals experienced by the regional economies. It is for this reason that one component of 
monetary regionalism has been an expansion of the scheme to include capital-rich North Asian 
economies like Japan. Third, the rate of interest needs to be sufficiently high as to guard against moral 
hazard, i.e. an increased readiness of creditors and debtors to court risks
47. Countries need to be 
discouraged from using such credit lines as a matter of course. Fourth, access to such liquidity needs 
to be separated from the detailed negotiation of conditionality which would prejudice quick dispersal; 
                                                           
46 In the final analysis, a referee notes the following: 
To the extent that capital is free to move and speculators can short sale the domestic currency, the 
demand for foreign currency is virtually infinite. Would foreign central banks be willing to inflate 
their money supply without restrictions to prevent a neighbor country from experiencing a crisis? 
If historical experience is any guide, they would not. At the time of the 1992 ERM crisis, 
Germany could well have extended credit lines to France, the UK and Italy. It did not. Since no 
country would agree to an infinite reserve swap, there is a limit to the stabilizing properties of 
such a scheme. This suggests that swap lines are likely to be effective only in combination with 
some form of ex post capital controls.  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the IMF has been fairly supportive of such unilateral actions to 
restrain international financial flows. For instance, a recent IMF study has concluded that measures to limit the 
offshore trading of currencies “could be effective if they were comprehensive and effectively enforced, and 
were accompanied by consistent macroeconomic policies and structural reform” (Ishii et al., 2001, p.1). 
Following the lead of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, have taken measures to curb currency speculation via 
the imposition of quantitative restrictions on foreign currency flows. 
 
47 The need to charge “prohibitively high” interest rates is, of course, the classic rule for a lender of last resort 
proposed by Walter Bagehot. Park (2001a) also discusses the issue of appropriate interest rate for a regional 
financial facility. Willett (2001b) suggests that ex ante lending facilities should follow a policy of “time escalating 
interest rates”. Admittedly, this does not solve the moral hazard problem at the creditor or investor level. We thank 
a referee for pointing this out. The way to limit such investor moral hazard would be for the private sector to share 




links to IMF conditionality may be some cause of concern. However, given the part played in the East 
Asian crisis by weak domestic financial structures, inadequate prudential standards and supervision, 
there is a strong argument for making access to the credit lines associated with the CMI conditional 
upon compliance with some minimum set of financial standards. This would encourage countries to 
push ahead with reforms to their domestic financial systems.  
A credible system of regional swaps based on these principles would have two key 
attractions. Not only would it enable participants to avoid the severe output losses that are associated 
with extreme shortages of liquidity but also, by creating confidence that such extreme shortages will 
not occur, the incidence of crises could be reduced. Of course, confidence would be undermined if the 
swap arrangements were used to try and defend disequilibrium real exchange rates and the CMI 
should not therefore be a mechanism for inappropriate currency pegging in the region. Again the 
history of bilateral swaps in the context of the Bretton Woods system demonstrates that they are an 
ineffective means of defending seriously misaligned currencies
48. 
Park (2001a) and Wang (2001) provide comprehensive descriptions of the CMI and offer 
useful suggestions on how it may be extended. We only note here that there are at least two further 
reasons to believe that regional arrangements to augment international liquidity have a comparative 
advantage over multilateral ones when it comes to the provision of contingent credit lines. First, 
regional credit lines would have more of the features of a credit union than the IMF possesses. All 
participants in them would be able to perceive circumstances in which they might themselves need to 
use the credit lines, and these vested interests ought to create a stronger motivation to make the 
system successful than might exist in the case of the IMF’s CCL. Second, prudential and supervisory 
                                                           
 
48 We should note that the Asian and Pacific region does in fact already have an existing financial cooperative 
scheme in place in the form of the EMEAP or the Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks. The 
EMEAP is a cooperative organization comprising central banks and monetary authorities of eleven economies: 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. Spurred on by the Tequila crisis of 1994-95, substantive steps towards monetary cooperation have 
been taken by the EMEAP. For instance, a number of member economies signed a series of bilateral repurchase 
(repo) agreements in 1995 and 1996. Hong Kong and Singapore also reached an agreement to intervene in foreign 
exchange markets on behalf of the Bank of Japan. These creditor regional economies also attempted to help defend 
the Thai baht for some period before the Bank of Thailand succumbed to the speculative pressures (Rajan, 2000). 






standards might be more appropriately set at the regional level where special circumstances could be 
more easily identified and addressed. 
Before proceeding, an important caveat is in order. The focus here has been on liquidity 
provision. Financial stability almost certainly requires complementary policies such as officially 
sanctioned standstills, collective action clauses, voluntary debt exchanges, along with a “constructive 
engagement” among creditors, debtors and regional and international financial institutions. As Willett 
(2001b) notes 
It is true that the provision of a LOLR is not the only way to deal with a liquidity crisis. 
Payments stand stills and other forms of private sector involvement (PSI) are also 
possible. Indeed many international monetary experts believe that such measures are 
likely to be a part of any efficient reform of the international financial architecture. I 
agree with this analysis, but would emphasize that such measures are likely to be only a 
complement not a full substitute for a LOLR. Developments on PSI should of course 
influence the size of loans from a LOLR (p.12)
49. 
 
5.4  Regionalism versus Multilateralism in the Architecture Debate 
If the Chiang-Mai initiative was to be built upon as a way of providing short-term liquidity at 
the regional level, a natural question is the extent to which this defines an agenda for an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF). A successful introduction of a network of regional swap arrangements in East 
Asia (possibly enlarged to encompass most of Asia as defined by the ADB over time) has been 
viewed by some observers as an important step towards the eventual creation of a full-fledged 
regional monetary facility (Ariff, 2001, Rowley, 2001 and Wang, 2001). 
Although early proposals for an AMF, coming from the Japanese government in September 
1997, were opposed strongly by the US and appeared to have been dropped, the proposal re-emerged 
at the East Asian Summit organized by the World Economic Forum in Singapore in October 1999. In 
November 1999, ASEAN ministers discussed the idea at an informal summit in the Philippines 
(Manila). A view that little progress has been achieved in reforming the international financial 
architecture has further re-ignited the debate about an AMF. The precise form that an AMF would 
take varies across the specific proposals. The original Japanese proposal envisaged its role as being 
                                                           
49 Indeed, referring to the CMI initiatives, a referee has also commented that “(w)ithout standstill or bond 




one of making available a pool of funds that would be disbursed quickly to provide emergency 
balance of payments support to countries in crisis. A related proposal by Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad, envisages a wider role. Here an AMF would be a:  
a small compact wholly regional funding organisation which would be deeply and 




  The IMF's new Managing Director, Horst Kohler, has expressed support for regional 
initiatives as long as they do not compete with the IMF (Kohler, 2001). 
  So would a new Asian financial architecture based perhaps on an Asian Monetary Fund 
threaten or facilitate international financial stability? Would regional reform be a stepping-stone or 
a stumbling bloc to international monetary reform? It could be a stumbling bloc if loans from the 
AMF carried conditionality that was inconsistent with that coming from the IMF. Moreover, the 
attitude amongst advanced economies that Asia is looking after its own problems could reduce the 
urgency with which reform at the international level is pursued. It is therefore important to identify 
the comparative advantages of regional and international financial institutions and the division of 
labor between them.  
Boughton (1997) has reminded us that “although the intention was that the availability of the 
Fund’s resources should prevent countries from experiencing financial crisis, in practice, the 
institution has often found itself helping its members cope with crises after they occur” (p.3). Reforms 
that allow the Fund to bolster significantly its lending capacity via quota increases or direct borrowing 
from private capital markets may be unlikely (Bird and Rowlands, 2001), Monetary and financial 
regionalism, as discussed in this paper, could help the IMF fulfill its stated aim; it is consistent with 
the principle of “subsidiarity”. Why choose to deal with a problem at the global level when it can be 
handled adequately and perhaps more effectively at the regional level? Just as multilateral trade 
liberalization and multilateral trade institutions have been joined by an increasing array of regional 
trading arrangements, regional financial crises may be better handled by regional arrangements. To 
the extent that regional arrangements may help reinvigorate interests in strengthening the international 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2001b) and the IMF (2001b) discuss the role of the private sector in resolving financial crises in some detail 




financial architecture, they could act as “stepping stones” towards multilateral reforms (Park, 2001a 
makes a similar argument). Regional arrangements ought to promote greater commitment to and 
national ownership of programs and conditionality, a point that is universally recognized as being of 
significant importance. 
Things could be organized along the following lines. On the basis of work done by the Basel 
Committee, an AMF could stipulate financial standards appropriate in an Asian context. Asian 
countries could commit themselves to achieve these standards over a specified time frame. Being on 
course in terms of meeting them could then be a precondition for financial support from the AMF in 
the event of contagion from a regional crisis. Loans from the AMF would carry nothing equivalent to 
IMF conditionality and would be available only on a short-term basis, and at a high interest rate to 
help deal with potential moral hazard problems. The very existence of additional short-term liquidity 
could reduce the incidence of speculation and crisis. Countries with fundamental and longer-term 
economic problems would still have to turn to the IMF, where they would be exposed to IMF 
conditionality. By providing an extra incentive for members to reform their domestic financial 
systems, a process, as noted earlier, that may yet not have gone far enough, the AMF could help to 
prevent future crises. By providing an additional source of short-term liquidity it could take financial 
pressure off the IMF during crisis periods. The IMF would continue to stand ready to assist economies 
where regional arrangements failed to resolve problems, but, in this event, it might be more 
reasonable to assume that these problems were not exclusively to do with shortages of liquidity, and 
this would raise the credibility of IMF conditionality. Elaborating on the issue, Park (2001a) notes: 
There is also the argument that regional financial management could be structured 
and managed to be complementary to the role of the IMF. For example, an East Asian 
regional fund could provide additional resources to the IMF while joining forces to 
work on matters related to the prevention and management of financial crises. An 
East Asian monetary fund could also support the work of the IMF by monitoring 
economic developments in the region and taking part in the IMF’s global surveillance 
activities. The East Asian monetary fund could also be designed initially as a regional 
lender of the last resort while the IMF assumes the role of prescribing 
macroeconomic policies to the member countries of the East Asian monetary fund 
(P.6). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




Beyond cooperation in surveillance, the AMF could work closely with the IMF to develop 
mechanisms appropriate for Asia to involve the private-sector involvement in crisis resolution and 
promote “constructive engagement” and constant dialogue among creditors and debtors (see fns 48 
and 51). In this way an AMF could contribute to enhanced international financial stability.  
 
6. Concluding  Remarks 
Although the debate about it was launched beforehand, much of the pressure for a new 
international financial architecture came about as a consequence of the East Asian crisis in 1997-98. 
Progress has been slow, piecemeal and largely cosmetic. Contagion from the crisis was regionally 
contained and this has reduced the motivation for reform at the global level. With the debate winding 
down, the chances of deep and meaningful reform are low. However, within the Asian region things 
may be different. It is the Asian economies that have experienced the ongoing costs of crisis and 
contagion. Moreover, Japan, the dominant regional power, remains trapped in the economic doldrums. 
Therefore, there is more motivation for reform at the regional level. 
Whilst dollarization may be inappropriate for Asian economies and talk of a regional currency 
union along European lines is at the very least premature, there is certainly scope for closer regional 
financial co-operation. If a new international financial architecture is unlikely, there is a better chance 
for a reformed Asian financial architecture. This could comprise the co-ordination of reforms to 
domestic financial systems, exchange rate policy and short-term contingency lending. An Asian 
Monetary Fund could provide an organizational framework within which co-operation could be 
orchestrated. 
Far from prejudicing international reform, which as noted has a low probability of success 
anyhow, and competing with the IMF, a reformed Asian financial architecture could make a positive 
contribution to enhanced global financial stability. It could help clarify the role of the IMF, reduce the 
resource constraints that the Fund sometimes encounters, reduce the need for the IMF to provide 
contingency credit lines - an area where it has been unsuccessful and is likely to remain so - and 
ameliorate the criticism that the IMF has opted for excessive conditionality, responding to liquidity 




eventually graduate away from the IMF. This has happened to the US and to the members of the 
European Union, even to the less rich ones. It may be that in the foreseeable future the move towards 
greater financial self-reliance in Asia is a fairly natural evolution that should be actively encouraged 
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Components Constituting Reform of the International Financial Architecture 
 
 
I.  Detecting and Monitoring External Vulnerability: While good macroeconomic policies and 
adequate foreign reserves remain the key to reducing vulnerability, work has concentrated on 
improving IMF surveillance of policies, and on tools to help countries better assess the risks 
they face. 
 
II.  Strengthening Financial Systems: Financial regulators need to upgrade supervision of banks and 
other financial institutions to keep up with the modern global economy and ensure that risk 
management and other practices keep institutions from getting into difficulties.  
 
III.  International Standards and Codes: Adherence to international standards and codes of good 
practices helps ensure that economies function well at the national level, which is a key 
prerequisite for a well-functioning international system.  
 
IV.  Capital Account Issues: Architecture reform aims to help countries benefit from international 
capital flows, an important element of which is helping them open to such flows in ways that 
avoid risks and emphasise careful preparation.  
 
VI.  Sustainable Exchange Rate Regimes: Financial crises have often been marked by inconsistencies 
between the exchange rate regime and other economic policies. The IMF is advising countries to 
choose a regime that fits its needs, especially in light of the risks of pegged exchange rates for 
countries open to international capital flows.  
 
VII.  Involving the Private Sector in Forestalling and Resolving Crises: Better involvement of the 
private sector in crisis prevention and management can limit moral hazard, strengthen market 
discipline by fostering better risk assessment, and improve the prospects for both debtors and 
creditors.  
 
VIII.  Reform of IMF Financial Facilities and Related Issues: The IMF is implementing important 
changes to help focus its lending on crisis prevention and to ensure more effective use of IMF 
funds.  
 
IX.  Measures to Increase Transparency: Measures are being taken to make available timely, reliable 
data, plus information about economic policies and practices, to inform both policymakers and 
market participants, and to reduce the risk of crisis.  
 
 






Summary of Measures to Deal with the Financial Crisis in East Asia 
 









Establishment of an over-arching 
restructuring authority 
 
Establishment of a separate bank 
restructuring authority 
 
Establishment of a centralized asset 
management corporation 
 
Adoption of a special corporate debt 
restructuring framework 
 




Intervention in financial institutions that 
were weak or insolvent. This would 
include: 
-  Mergers of weak institutions 
-  Closure of insolvent institutions 
 
Use of public funds to purchase 
nonperforming assets 
 
Use of public funds to recapitalize 
institutions including: 
-  State intervention in banks 
 
Elimination or dilution of current 




Measures to encourage corporate 
restructuring 
 















































































































































































































































    Notes:  a) Steering committee chaired by the central banks; b) the powers of pre-existing AMC were substantially 
increased; c) the FRA was established to illiquidate 56 closed finance companies, and the AMC to deal with 
residual FRA assets; d) between government owned intervened institutions 
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share of GDP 































60 - 85 
20 - 30 
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Notes:  NPLs are measured on a three-month basis; and the unofficial estimate includes assets carved out for sale by the   
AMCs 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Frankel and Wei (1994)
a 
 
US dollar        Japanese 





 US dollar       Japanese 
                            yen 
 
Kim and Ryou (2001)
c 
 
  US dollar       Japanese   





   0.16 
 
0.99 0.00 0.97 0.01 
Malaysian ringgit  0.78 
 
   0.07 
    
0.84 0.04 0.87 0.08 
Philippine peso  1.07 
 
  -0.01  1.15  -0.24  1.07  0.04 
Singapore dollar  0.75 
 
    0.13 
  
0.64   0.11 0.68 0.13 
Thai baht  0.91 
 
    0.05 
 
0.82   0.11 0.82 0.11 
Simple Average   0.89     0.08  0.88  0.00   0.88  0.07 
 
Notes:   a) Based on weekly movements for the period January 1979 to May 1992   
               b) Based on weekly movements for the period January 1991 to May 1995 





East Asian Exchange Rates Statistics, 1990-96 
 
 Domestic  Currency  Per 
US dollar in 1990 
Domestic Currency Per US 
dollar in 1996  
Exchange Rate Variability 
(1990-96)
a 








































  0.00  
  0.13 
  0.00 
 
18.78 
  0.00 
  0.13 
  0.00 
  
  Notes:   a) coefficient of variation for the entire period 1990-96   









 Market Activity (US
$ billions):  
Selected East























   214.6 
    97.9 





   1.5 
   1.1 




  0.7 
  1.1 



















  94.3 
 148.6 




  4.3 
49.5 
  4.5 
  3.5 
15.5 
  
    N
otes:  
a) billions $, 1997 data; 
b) billions of US dollars
, as of April 1998; 
c) average daily t
urnover 
to    
  
GDP ratio 
                    
Source: 





Cumulative Output Losses of the East Asian Crisis 
(in percent of “potential” output) 
 
  














Notes:    a) “Calculated as the sum of the output gap over a four year period, starting with the 
crisis year. The output gap is defined as the percentage difference between the actual and the 
hypothetical (or ‘potential’) level of real GDP for each country. Graphically, the cumulative 
output loss would thus be represented by the area between the ‘potential’ and actual output 
paths, starting from the crisis year and expressed as a percentage of “potential” real GDP. It 
follows that accumulated losses will be positive, and possibly large, even in cases where output 
is back to ‘potential’ at the end of the four-year period. In the counterfactual scenario, it is 
assumed that ‘potential’ GDP grows at 4 percent per annum and that actual and ‘potential’ 
output coincided within the two-year period preceding the crisis. ‘Actual’ GDP during 1999-
2002 refers to IMF projections” 







External Debt of the East Asian Economies
a, 1995-1999 












































































































Notes:   a) Data for Indonesia exclude trade credits 







Bilateral Exchange Rates Relative to US Dollar










































Source: ARIC (www.aric.org) 
 




Source: ARIC (www.aric.org) 
 
Figure 2
Index of Gross International Reserves Less Gold in Asia-5 Economies, 1997-2001 
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